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Abstract
This thesis examines possible philosophies to account for the prac-
tice of mathematics, exploring the metaphysical, ontological, and epis-
temological outcomes of each possible theory. Through a study of the
two most probable ideas, mathematical platonism and fictionalism,
I focus on the compelling argument for platonism given by an ap-
peal to the sciences. The Indispensability Argument establishes the
power of explanation seen in the relationship between mathematics
and empirical science. Cases of this explanatory power illustrate how
we might have reason to believe in the existence of mathematical en-
tities present within our best scientific theories. The second half of
this discussion surveys Newtonian Cosmology and other inconsistent
theories as they pose issues that have received insignificant attention
within the philosophy of mathematics. The application of these incon-
sistent theories raises questions about the effectiveness of mathematics
to model physical systems.
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1 The Division of Platonism and Fictionalism
1.1 Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics
The history of mathematics is full of mathematical problems with philosoph-
ical significance. This is no surprise when we trace the roots of mathematics
and philosophy. Both of these fields came into interest because of their ability
make useful models of the world. The origins of mathematics are up for de-
bate, but a rough sketch can be made by seeing mathematics as social field.
As our ancestors began asking questions about the planets and stars they
started forming models and theories accounting for what the saw. Over cen-
turies these elementary models became the modern notion of orbits. These
measuring tools gave rise to modern planetary science and astronomy. This
human thirst to quantify is unquenchable, because in mathematics the more
questions we answer the more questions we ask. The field of mathematics
has grown exponentially, however, the same philosophical questions still re-
main. The notion of infinity or the idea of an empty set might be troubling
for mathematicians and philosophers alike. A fundamental understanding of
the nature of these problems is found by studying what mathematical objects
and theorems consist of. The implications of accepting one philosophical the-
ory over another spreads to problems in broader ontology and metaphysics.
I wish to focus on The Indispensability Argument for platonism and the pos-
sible issues it faces with the inconsistencies in the field of mathematics. Here
we focus on two of the most successful philosophical theories of mathematical
objects.
The question about the existence of mathematical objects is more contro-
versial than one may initially think. There are epistemological and metaphys-
ical issues that are entangled in the acceptance of either theory. Philosophers
initially thought Plato's theory of the Forms gave a comprehensive idea of the
developing field of mathematics. The ideas from the broader metaphysical
theory carried naturally to mathematical entities, mainly due to the formal-
ization of the Forms. Plato scheemed an abstract heaven filled with perfect
entities outside of our idea of space and time. To illustrate this idea it is
useful to look at an example of a circle. We can draw a representation of
a circle on a piece of paper but it is fundamentally different than the circle
in the Forms. If we draw three circles in a row we can pick which one is
the most perfect, which shows that we have some intuition of this perfect
circle Plato suggests. However, the perfect circle is imperceivable because
the circle in the Forms has no size, no color, and no physical properties. A
reasonable question is if we can't perceive or have any causal relations with
the Forms how are we able to have knowledge about them? Plato claimed
that prior to our souls finding physical bodies on earth they had access to
the Forms of abstract entities in the heaven. Furthermore, our experiences
on earth reflect our efforts to remember the Forms to the best of our ability.
Unsurprisingly the latter part of Plato's theory has been buried many times
over. The idea of abstract mathematical entities, however, has remained as
the foundation of mathematical platonism.
1.2 Mathematical Platonism
Similarly to Plato's theory, mathematical platonism is committed to objec-
tive mathematical entities. Plato's explanation requires accepting the soul
to explain the possibility of connecting with The Forms. Although mathe-
matical platonism has certain parallels with Plato's theories, it is best to see
Plato's ideology as the starting point. Platonism (from here on describing
modern mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are ab-
stract mathematical objects that exist independent of the human practice,
ambition, or language. If you asked a platonist what the Gaussian prime
(4 + 2i) refers to, they would say (4 + 2i) is an abstract object that doesn't
rely on our knowledge for it to exist. There is no physical representation
of this prime. We cannot know the number three by experiencing three ap-
ples on a table based on our inability to have a causal connection with “3”.
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The number three is an abstract mathematical entity that is independent
of our perception. Platonism is defined by the acceptance of three theses:
existence, abstractness, and independence. Each of these theses weighs heav-
ily on the ontological commitments of platonism, and without each of them
being justified separately the rest will unravel.
1.2.1 Existence
I want to look at what abstract existence entails before looking at the spe-
cific cases of mathematical objects and their abstractness. The questionable
existence of abstract objects creates a divide within different sectors of phi-
losophy. Drawing the line between concrete and abstract objects has been
controversial because of the epistemological consequences. David Lewis in
his book “On The Plurality of Worlds”, surveys the possible ways of distin-
guishing between the concrete and the abstract. The first way is called The
Way of Abstraction which asks us to take a concrete object and remove all
specificity from it. A blue shirt, blueberries, and the sky are concrete exam-
ples of blue things but “the color blue” is abstract. Class nominalists, who
deny the existence of any abstracta, claim “the color blue” is nothing more
than the set of all of the blue things but is not a distinct entity. Lewis defines
to The Way of Example next. This urges a person to make a list of standard
cases of abstract and concrete objects with the hope that the distinction will
appear [17]. The Way of Negation points to the idea that concrete entities
are in space and time and are causally efficacious, where abstract objects are
not. Therefore, it suffices to label objects that do not fit these properties as
abstract. Frege claimed an object could only be abstract if and only if it is
non–physical, non–mental, and causally inefficacious. Further thoughts on
epistemology and metaphysics depend on how a person categorizes abstract
objects. For example, the empiricist takes issue with granting the existence
of abstract entities based on their ideas of how we come to knowledge. The
properties of causality and spatial location make it unclear how we are able
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to become aware of the existence of these abstracta. We will see an attempt
to get around this issue in section 1.3.6 with James Robert Brown.
The argument for the existence of mathematical entities is the platonist's
first responsibility. The second thesis of abstractness follows close behind,
because clearly we cannot prove the existence of mathematical objects in the
same way we would show the existence of a spider or a chair. Therefore,
the platonist must show that abstract entities exist. The platonist wants
to argue that mathematical objects are in existence similarly an electron.
Electrons escape the verification through physical interaction and have prop-
erties that are unknown to us [18]. The independent lives of electrons are
not governed by our understanding of them, however, we are able to know
facts about electrons through experiments that capture the electrons salient
properties. We have given the name “electron” to attempt to capture the
abstract phenomenon of the electron. Mathematics is the same in practice,
because we are trying to strategically tow mathematical truths out of our
mathematical systems.
Possibly the most qualified speaker on the matter of the existence of math-
ematical objects was Gottlob Frege. Frege was a German mathematician,
philosopher, and one of the founding fathers of modern logic. His ambition
to argue for platonism worked alongside his argument that all mathematical
truths could be boiled down to the general laws of logic. Frege made a separa-
tion between two kinds of expressions we use as linguistic models: saturated
and unsaturated. He defined saturated expressions as singular terms such
as proper nouns and unsaturated remarks as predicates or quantifiers. This
distinction, according to Frege, accurately mirrors a metaphysical difference
within our thoughts. Our thoughts are made from saturated “objects” and
unsaturated “concepts” [8]. He uses this outlook to form his argument for
arithmetic–object platonism. His argument begins with the claim that sin-
gular terms which refer to natural numbers can be seen within true simple
statements. Simple statements with singular terms as components are only
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true if the referred objects exist. Therefore, the natural numbers must ex-
ist. If the natural numbers exist then they are mind–independent abstract
objects because they are neither mental nor physical [8]. Frege's Existence
Thesis relies on a number of controversial claims. He assumes the natural
numbers exist because singular terms that refer to them appeal in true simple
statements. Frege uses identity statements to illustrate how this is true. For
example, 4 + 3 = 7 is an identity claim using 4, 3, and 7. In order for this to
be true, the numbers we refer to must exist. A similar argument for truth of
mathematical sentences is seen within Putnam and Quine 's Indispensability
Argument. However, in this case our sentences involve scientific statements
that use mathematics indispensably.
Perhaps the most convincing argument for mathematical platonism is The
Indispensability Argument given by Hilary Putnam and William Van Orman
Quine. In the next chapter I take a closer look at the argument for platonism
through the indispensability of mathematics in science, however, for now I
simply want to give an overview of how the argument fits in with the rest
of the outlook. The argument begins by making the claim that we ought to
be ontologically committed to the things that are indispensable to our best
scientific theories. We will see issues with this argument based on this notion
of stagnant science later, however, it is important to recognize the evolution
of scientific truths. Some argue that our scientific theories are not true but
act as good approximations that help us predict things to a good degree.
Through time these theories get abandoned and replaced by better theories
that can adapt to our current picture of the world. Putnam and Quine state
that mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories,
therefore, we need to acknowledge the existence of mathematical entities.
If both of the premises are true then mathematical sentences are true and
we are justified in believing these truths according to Putnam and Quine's
argument. Before granting these two theses as true, we need to have a closer
look at the roots of the argument. In order to prove The Indispensability
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Argument we must show there is an overlap between our mathematical theory
and our empirical theory.
According to Putnam, platonism and the acceptance of science go hand
in hand. To argue against platonism while accepting the scientific method
would be like “maintaining that neither God nor angels exist but claiming
that it was an objective fact that God put an angel in charge of each star.”
Putnam and Quine rely on the philosophical stances of naturalism and con-
firmation holism to take them from their observations of empirical evidence
to their first premise. More specifically we should be ontologically commit-
ted to the things that are indispensable to our scientific theories. Naturalism
practitioners safely abandon the search for a first philosophy by leaning ex-
clusively on the scientific method to study and identify reality. Confirmation
holism rejects sections of our theories in isolation, and demands we can only
confirm or deny theories as a whole. Therefore, evidence for a set of scientific
sentences that use mathematics indispensably is also support for the validity
of the part of the theory tied to the mathematical entities. An entire the-
ory can be confirmed if the theory's validity rides on empirical findings. In
the case of this particular argument we see how mathematical entities are
only confirmed by the confirmation of the larger scientific theory. Naturalism
claims the mathematical part of the theory serves as a mirror of the reality
we are modeling. The truth of the theory commits us to the existence of the
entities involved, including the mathematical objects.
1.2.2 Abstractness
To add abstractness to the picture does not seem so controversial if we are
already on board with the existence of mathematical entities. A well rounded
notion of abstraction in this platonistic sense is easily understood when tak-
ing the characteristics of a physical object (size, weight, taste, color) and
seeing how these descriptions can not possibly refer to mathematical objects.
This is more explanatory when one thinks about what it would be like if
6
these mathematical entities were physical. How much would the number
twelve weigh? What is the empty set made of? These questions seem far-
fetched and that is precisely the point. Linnebo speaks to this phenomenon
by noticing that if mathematical entities were physical then mathematicians
would concern themselves with the outright physical nature of mathematical
objects [18]. This is the first time we have leaned on the working mathemati-
cian and their practice to help us solve philosophical problems. Later we will
take a closer look at the intricate nature of the mathematician. A more
hands-on argument for the abstractness of mathematical objects is given by
the fictionalist later in the chapter, however, this is already fairly convincing.
1.2.3 Independence
Independence is the last premise for the platonist to verify, and seemingly
the most difficult to overcome. The platonist must show that mathemati-
cal activity is independent from all other rational activity. This seems clear
when thinking about what it would look like if the converse were true. Under
the conditions that the platonist wants to subscribe, mathematics is inde-
pendent of our thoughts, practices, and speech. The entity of pi would still
govern much of our universe even if we didn't yet have the tools to uncover
the pattern ourselves. The area of a circle involving pi was not a response to
human recognition of the value. A dodecahedron would have the same fea-
tures regardless of human's rational activity. If an alien from planet X saw
a dodecahedron it would have the same properties as our dodecahedron on
earth, even though our rational activities are very different. Mathematical
properties are inherent to the object we refer to, which can help explain the
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics [28]. Mathematics simply would
not be as accurate if the properties of mathematical entities relied on any-
thing else but their innate properties. There is an objectivity of mathematics
that is captured by this independence thesis. Leaning on our notion of the
working mathematician, it would not make sense to have a dependent math-
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ematical theory. What exactly would it be dependent on? There are some
stimulating arguments for the stubborn philosopher who needs more reason
to believe in this independence. Kurt Godel proved his Incompleteness The-
orem and in doing so brought to surface two interesting notions within both
mathematics and philosophy. I am going to reproduce a similar outline given
by Rudy Rucker in “Infinity and the Mind” because he successfully captures
how clever Godel's proof really is [25].
Let's pretend a woman approaches Godel and tells him that she had a
machine that had captured all of the truth in the universe, let's call this
Machine X. According to the creator, Machine X was capable of answering
any question correctly. Godel asks the woman for the program and internal
design of Machine X, P(X), and no matter how long this program is, it must
be finite because it was programmed in a finite amount of time. Godel writes
out the following sentence, sentence Y: “Machine X constructed on the basis
of P(X) will never say that this sentence is true.” This sentence has the same
logical setup as the sentence, X will never say Y is true. Now, Godel asks X
if sentence Y is true or false. There are two possible answers that Machine
X could give, X could say that Y is true or X could say that Y is false. If X
says that the sentence is true then the sentence “X will never say Y is true”
is false, therefore if X says Y is true then Y is in fact false. If “X will never
say Y is true” is false, then Y is false. If X says Y is true then it must be
the case that Y is false and Machine X made a false statement. Therefore,
X can never say that sentence Y is true because it would be wrong. We can
now conclude that Machine X is not universal because we found a truth that
was unaccounted for.
This proof utterly demolishes the search for complete logical foundations
for mathematics, much to Whitehead, Hilbert, Russell's dismay. The mathe-
matical symbolism of this proof is that any system using arithmetic is incom-
plete. Given a set of axioms there exist some true mathematical sentences
that simply can not be derived by the given set. Within a set where an infi-
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nite amount of truths can be developed there will similarly be some that can
not be derived and therefore the set will always be incomplete. This points to
the phenomenon that is happening objectively in mathematics, more specifi-
cally, that the ultimate truth can not be be attained by our rationality. Godel
concludes mathematical entities are independent of our thought because our
best efforts can never contain all truths in mathematics. Any attempt will
be incomplete or inconsistent. The independence criterion is one of many
consequences of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. In Chapter Four we will
see how the inconsistent aspect of Godel's proof shattered naive–set theory.
1.3 Transitioning to Fictionalism
In this account of mathematical platonism it is important to unpack the
mathematical sentence. When looking at other alternatives to platonism we
will see how this facet of the proof differs. So far mathematical sentences
have been taken literally and at face value. Under this face–value notion of
mathematical terms, the sentences “Three is an odd number” and “Theresa
is an odd girl” are both literal. Both cases require the existence of the subject
in question. In Putnam and Quine's argument, when we read our scientific
theories at face value they are committed to existence of mathematical enti-
ties. We are mathematical realists when we read mathematical sentences at
face value. In order to assign a truth value to these mathematical sentences
we are ontologically committed to the objects they refer to. There are many
ways to disagree with the platonist claim, however I want to focus on one
regarding semantics. Mathematical fictionalism argues that the utterance of
mathematical sentences should be taken at face value as if they were pointing
to some object in the world. However, we should not accept these sentences
as expressing any truth value.
Fictionalism provides the principal philosophical rebuttal to mathemati-
cal platonism. Fictionalism rejects the platonist account of metaphysics and
creates an entirely new and convincing ontology along the way. Unlike pla-
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tonism, fictionalism denies the existence of abstract objects. Referring back
to the justification of abstract mathematical entities, the possibility of these
objects being physical is seemingly out of the question. The fictionalist,
like the platonist, approaches the metaphysical problem by noticing that our
mathematical sentences refer to abstract entities. This can not be the case
because there are no such things as abstract objects, therefore, our math-
ematical sentences are false. When engaged in mathematical discourse, we
don't mean our sentences literally in regards to truth value. Instead, we are
pretending that there are mathematical objects in order to get some point
across. As we look closer at the consequences we may realize that from a
purely philosophical standpoint the fictionalist may have it right. One way
they could go about their attack is to argue for materialism. Instead, they
argue against all other possibilities leaving fictionalism on the other side as
the only choice.
1.3.1 Paraphrase Nominalism
The semantic claim of the fictionalist is especially troublesome to paraphrase
nominalism. Referring to our previous example, the sentence “three is an odd
number” refers directly to the number three. This is not controversial to the
platonist, however, it is controversial within other schools of mathematical
philosophy. The paraphrase nominalist holds that the sentence “three is
odd” is really saying “if there were numbers, then three would be odd.” The
fictionalist responds to this by claiming the view of paraphrase nominalism
involves an empirical claim about what we mean when we use mathematical
language that seems unlikely. It is hard to believe that when mathematicians
speak about their theories they really mean to say something like what the
nominalist is pushing for. There is a lot of evidence that mathematical
discourse should be read at face value, and very little for the converse. If
mathematicians had the intention to be understood non literally it seems as
though they would give some indication of this desire. However, there is an
10
additional issue with this appeal to mathematicians that we will see when
we look at the application of naive–set theory in Chapter Four.
The paraphrase nominalist might reply by saying that they do not need
to appease the practice of the mathematicians. If they do reply with this,
then their view will quickly collapse into fictionalism because they will be
claiming that the discourse of actual mathematicians is false. If this is true,
then it seems like they are simply fictionalists that think we should alter what
we mean when we talk about mathematics. We can accept that mathemat-
ical sentences should be read at face value because paraphrase nominalism
declines to offer a counter argument the fictionalist needs to take seriously.
1.3.2 Neo-meinongianism
The fictionalist must enforce their premise about the impossibility of the
truth value in mathematical sentences. Fictionalism says that when we read
sentences at face value and we claim that they are true, then there must be
some mathematical object the sentence is referring to. Neo-meinongianism
is the school of philosophy that claims the truth of mathematical sentences
isn't contingent on the positive existence of abstract objects. The neo-
meinongianism and the fictionalist are disagreeing about what must be the
case in order for something to be true in ordinary conversations. The view
is that there are non-existent entities that numerals refer to. According to
the platonist, the sentence “17 is prime” says “there is something that is 17
and that thing is prime”. Here if the first sentence is true then the second
has to be true. On the other hand, to neo-meinongianism the sentence “17
is prime” is true without 17 being an abstract entity in existence.
They agree with the fictionalist that the mathematical sentences seem
to be about irreferable abstract entities. If they had a standard acceptance
of truth then the neo-meinongianist would collapse into fictionalism. To be
distinct the neo-meinongianist must make a claim about the ordinary sense
of the term true when the claim is about something that does not exist. The
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fictionalist can implore our intuition when we say a sentence is true. For
example, when one says “it is true the grass is green”, our intuition is to
think that there is such a thing as grass.
This semantic problem isn't the only issue with neo-meinongianism. The
platonist offers another point of contrast. On the surface neo-meinongianism
looks like we still have a way around platonism, especially if it collapses into
fictionalism. Let's consider two notions of true, called X and Y. Truth X
refers to the kind of truth that entails the existence of the subject of conver-
sation, like in the grass example above. Truth Y is the kind of truth that the
neo-meinongianist is trying to put into practice, in other words, Y is the kind
of truth from a sentence where the sentence doesn't successfully refer to the
existence of the object in question. A possible platonist response would be to
slightly tweak their philosophy to show they have been arguing for X truth
all along. When we use the word “true” in ordinary language we are unaffili-
ated whether we are talking about X or Y. This question only surfaces when
philosophers get involved. The Indispensability Argument argues for X truth
in mathematics. It seems as though the neo-meinongianist semantic thesis
was irrelevant to this overall conversation about truth. We should really fo-
cus on the platonists argument for the X kind of truth. Therefore, it boils
down to the two philosophies still in question, fictionalism and platonism.
1.3.3 Physicalism
The secured abstraction of mathematical entities is the next step in the fic-
tionalist argument. We have seen a partial argument for the necessity of
mathematical entities being abstract, however, the fictionalist gives us a dif-
ferent account. The fictionalist agrees with the platonist about the necessary
abstraction of such entities as mathematical objects. Physicalism and psy-
chologism give two opposite viewpoints that try to explain mathematical
objects without abstraction. Physicalism claims our sentences refer to physi-
cal objects. This idea is less controversial when one thinks about elementary
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mathematics, however, when we consider mathematics in multidimensions
it becomes less apparent. In knot theory, for example, we see the physical
representation of the trefoil knot by simply making one out of string. Phys-
icalism falls short when we are asked to find a physical representation of the
knot with infinite crossings, or the knot made from an infinite number of
trefoils together in a line. This issue of infinity is especially apparent in set
theory, made more confusing with the idea of different sizes of infinity. Even
if a physicalist could figure out a way to make the mathematical concept
of infinity somehow physical, the notion of different sizes of infinities would
surely stump them.
Georg Cantor, born in Russia in 1845, was the inventor of set theory. Set
theory is of extreme importance in our conversation of philosophy of mathe-
matics. Cantor allowed his mathematical achievements to shape his theolog-
ical viewpoint. He claimed that a world without infinite numbers could not
possible have a God with infinite power. His quest to prove the existence of
the multitudes of infinite sets was perpetuated by his idea that God was the
Absolute Infinite and all other infinities consequently were smaller than this
one. The proof of this concept is relatively simple, and can be reproduced
with an elementary notion of set theory. Cantor's diagonal argument was
published in 1891. This proof shows that there are infinite sets that are un-
able to form a one-to-one correspondence with the infinite set of the natural
numbers. His proof begins with a set that we are familiar with, the counting
numbers. Let's define this as set S. S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . } The infinity prop-
erty of the counting numbers is that we can always get another number by
adding 1 to the last number in the set. Cantor defined a set as “countably
infinite” if an infinite set has members that can be illustrated as a one–to–
one correspondence with the counting numbers. These countable infinite sets
have some interesting properties that provoked Cantor. For example, there
are subsets of countably infinite sets that are also countable infinite. One
might think there would be half as many even numbers as counting numbers,
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however, Cantor proved that you can make a one–to–one correspondence
with these two sets. He paired the numbers up in the following set P.
P = {(n, 2n) where n = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . }
This shows that there is still a countable infinity when we look at half of
a countable infinity. He then showed that the set of real numbers is not a
countable infinity by proving it is not possible to have a bijection between the
reals and the natural numbers. He does this by using his diagonal method
with creating a numbered list of the elements within an infinite set and
flipping numbers to uncover a missing string. From here, Cantor concludes
there are infinitely many sizes of infinite sets because one could complete
this process with any infinite set at come to the same conclusion. For a
complete translated proof refer to Keith Simmon's translation of Cantor's
1892 masterpiece [?].
Cantor shows through his proof that these infinities, although sometimes
distinguishable (as seen with the real numbers vs. the listable integers), are
mysterious in ways that are unimaginable precisely because of the finiteness
of the human mind. It seems as though this proof, born from set theory, is
one of the greatest challenges for the physicalist because of our inability to
comprehend even the smallest infinity. The physicalist, if still serious about
their philosophy, would have to be able to point to some physical entity
for every mathematical entity because physicalism would unravel with the
possibility of one aspect being unaccountable.
1.3.4 Psychologism
Psychologism is perhaps more plausible than physicalism, however, the issues
with psychologism arise in a similar way. Psychologism, like physicalism,
tries to argue against the idea that the existence of mathematical entities
entails that these entities must be abstract. This view describes ordinary
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mathematical sentences as the true descriptions we make about the objects in
our minds. Again, this seems plausible for elementary mathematical objects
such as “3” however, the idea of infinity, let alone infinitely many infinities,
seems unbreachable by this analysis. If psychologism is a possibility we
would have to have infinitely many ideas in our minds, which simply isn't
the case. Notice how this thesis is not saved by arguing that we have the
idea of infinity in our minds. In order to save psychologism, there needs to
be proof of infinitely many ideas in our minds because there are infinitely
many mathematical entities that need to be accounted for. Therefore, when
we utter mathematical sentences our theories are not descriptions of these
mental entities. Another issue with this thesis is that it seems to miss out on
the objectivity of mathematics. If we believe that mathematical entities are
just figments of an individual's mind, then we better have an explanation for
why mathematics is so universally agreed upon.
1.3.5 Humanism: The Social
We have seen the standard arguments for the mental and the physical exis-
tence of mathematical objects. In his book, “What is Mathematics, Really?”,
Rueben Hersh offers another possibility to the mix: the social. Hersh claims
that mathematics is essentially a social phenomenon and a human activity.
Mathematics is socially evolved and can only be understood within a social
context [15]. Based on this definition of mathematics, he does not see the
need to look for a definition of mathematics beyond this cultural meaning.
Hersh gives an example of a 4–dimensional cube as his initial “inquiry
into mathematical existence” [15]. He notices by appealing to the character-
istics of the 1–D, 2–D, and 3–D cube, that there is a pattern than extends to
the cube outside of our perception. This experiment provokes Hersh to ask if
the 4–D cube exists. If so, then what kind of existence is it? If not, then how
can we infer so many details about it? Furthermore, does the 3–D cube exist
in our space and time? Hersh claims that his humanist view of mathematics
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accounts for these questions more adequately than other philosophies. Hu-
manism claims this cube exists within the shared consciousness of people as
a thought or idea [15]. In a more simple case, Hersh explains how to think
about the integers. The number “three” for example, is considered culturally
as a noun and an adjective. It is noun insofar as it can refer to a real ob-
ject but there is a social process that separates this distinction and creates a
“shared concept in the minds/brains of people who know elementary arith-
metic” [15]. On the other hand, the number “three” is an adjective because
it amounts to the process of counting. Hersh claims the counting numbers
are really finite because we do not see people counting to 923783782939. This
idea is plausible with these specific cases, however, humanism falls short
describing other mathematical truths– such as infinity. We have seen how
psychologism and physicalism fumble with the idea of infinities, especially
infinitely many sizes of infinity. Hersh agrees with psychologism that the
brain is finite, but argues that “it is not the infinite that our brains generate,
but the notions of the infinite” [15]. To claim that the “notions of infinity”
can exist within the brain needs some back up that Hersh does not offer.
This might not be enough of a reason to completely give up on Hersh's hu-
manism, but the implications of this issue should push Hersh to address this
more seriously.
1.3.6 Against Platonism
For the final premise of the fictionalist argument we see the direct jab at
platonism, more specifically, there are no such things as abstract objects.
This step is the most difficult because as we have seen the fictionalist has
developed a standard argument to rule out most of the other philosophies in
question. However, because the platonist agrees with the fictionalist under
the aforementioned claims about semantics and the word “true”, the fiction-
alist needs to come up with something else to overrule the platonist. In the
attempt to cross platonism off of the list, the fictionalist appeals to their
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theory of human knowledge. This theory has been extremely popular within
the history of philosophy and is rooted in the importance of sense percep-
tions to form belief. In order to form justifiable knowledge of an entity, one
has to receive a sense perception from that entity in some way. According to
the platonist picture, these mathematical objects exist outside of our reality.
Therefore it is unreasonable to think we are able to sense them with our five
senses let alone form any kind of substantial knowledge about them. In other
words, causal contact is necessary to have a sense perception and according
to platonism that this is not how mathematical entities exist.
James Robert Brown offers an explanation as to how platonism can re-
spond to this problems of access [5]. He notes a disconnect in our understand-
ing of everyday physical objects about how a sensation becomes a belief. The
physiological process of how sense perceptions operate is understood, how-
ever, the belief formation process is still a grand mystery [5]. The nominalist
claims the platonist must come up with an explanation as to how mathemat-
ical entities become mathematical beliefs. However, this issue is no worse
than our inability to understand this phenomenon in the world outside of
mathematics.
Brown gives a response to the additional issue of causality. The abstrac-
tion of these objects seems to disable possible causal connection between the
realized object and the observer. Favored among naturalism, the causal the-
ory of knowledge seems reasonable. For every thought there must be a causal
chain between the object and our minds. I know there is a cup of coffee in
front of me because photons from the coffee enter my eyes. I know events
from the past because people who had direct causal contact recorded the
events and their recordings were brought to me through this chain. If this
model is correct, there would be no possibility of knowing abstract objects.
Brown shows a flaw in the argument by providing an example in the physical
world where this causal chain is unapparent.
There is a thought experiment in quantum mechanics posited by Einstein,
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Podolsky, and Rosen. In this experiment, there is a decay process that pro-
duces two photons going in opposite directions towards detectors on either
side of the space. Each detector has polaroid filters that determine if the
approaching photon has the spin–up or spin–down property. The two out-
comes of the photons are always correlated. If one of the photons is spin–up
then the other is necessarily spin–down. There is an aspect of randomness
because before the experiment we do not know which one will end up at ei-
ther side. The question is within this perfect correlation of the photons. One
idea is that the measuring tool causes the outcome of the other. However, we
can rule this explanation out by applying special relativity claiming that no
causal power travel faster than light. Brown notes that the two simultaneous
measurements are outside of each other's light cones so there is no possibil-
ity of them causally affecting the other. Another possibility is that there is
something at the time of the creation of the photons that explains this prop-
erty. This cannot be the case because of the Bell result showing that, “such a
common cause predicts a different measurement outcome than either quan-
tum mechanics predicts or experience determines” [5]. He concludes from
this case that knowledge does not necessarily rely on a casual connection. If
a person was on one side of the experiment and saw the result spin–up they
could automatically infer the other side was spin–down without having any
causal connection to the other wing. This example is thought–provoking, but
rests on profound presumptions from the physical world. My issue with this
example is that we are only able to infer any information about the photon
because it exists in binary. If, for example, there were three possible states
then we could not know anything about the photon. Our supposed causally
unaffected knowledge rests on the knowledge that the photon must exist in
one of two states which is previous knowledge.
The argument against abstracta is one of the most convincing arguments
against platonism, however if someone is skeptical about this metaphysical
issue there is an interesting mathematical argument against platonism as
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well. Originally by Benacerraf, the arithmetic multiple–reductions argument
starts by postulating a set of numbers. Benacerraf claims that if there exists a
set of abstract entities that are coherent with our theories in arithmetic then
there are infinitely many of these sets. Furthermore, when we pick out the set
of integers there is nothing metaphysically special about it in comparison to
a different one of the infinite sets. However, Benacerraf notes that if we are
platonists then we believe that there is a unique sequence of abstract entities
that are the integers, and therefore platonism must be getting it wrong. He
uses the structuralist view of the natural numbers to make the argument. He
claims that numbers cannot be objects because when we give the properties
of numbers we are simply characterizing the abstract structure. This view
means that the numbers have no properties besides the properties that they
have within their sequence relationally.
It is unclear how successful this argument is, however it is worth men-
tioning because it forces the deciding philosopher to ask questions about the
nature of these abstract sets. If these arguments against all other possible
philosophies are granted successful, then fictionalism is the only option left
and we would be foolish not to believe it.
Now that I have explained the two propositions given to us by the platon-
ist and the fictionalist it is time to decide on a stance as to who got it right.
To reiterate, the question that has been up for debate between platonism and
fictionalism is the question of mathematical objects and their questionable
existence. A very simple recap of the two arguments is that the platonist
is lacking on epistemological accounts, whereas the fictionalist is fumbling
where metaphysics are involved. The problem here has seemingly reached a
philosophical dead end because the only way for one argument to be refuted
is for the other argument to restate one of their premises.
I want to move my conversation towards a focus on The Indispensability
Argument given by Putnam and Quine. This argument is one of the more
convincing arguments for platonism and therefore needs to be looked at closer
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to make sure we aren't missing anything before we admit the existence of
abstract mathematical entities. The Indispensability Argument has high
stakes because it illustrates accepting mathematical entities as a necessity
to scientific inquiry. The Indispensability Argument might be precisely why
followers of platonism were willing to take the metaphysical leap.
2 The Indispensability Argument and Scien-
tific Inquiry
2.1 Another Look at The Indispensability Argument
While the first chapter merely glanced at The Indispensability Argument,
we are now going to take a closer look into the strength of this argument.
It garners its first premise from an observation embedded in the philosophy
of science, particularly in the way that our theorems in mathematics act
as an indispensable part of our best theories in science. The practice of sci-
ence relies on the ability to use mathematical objects as explanatory entities.
When scientists have evidence for a specific theory, the evidence corresponds
to the theory as a whole as opposed to referring to the individual hypotheses.
Given these two points, if we have evidence for a scientific theory, then this
set of evidence is also evidence for the mathematical principles it presup-
poses. In addition to this claim, The Indispensability Argument says that
science is the best vehicle for gathering evidence pointing to truth and exis-
tence. Therefore, the mathematical principles are true and the mathematical
entities exist as much as the entities proposed by the scientific theories. This
last point adds an interesting complication; by accepting our theories in sci-
ence as true, we are forced to accept the mathematical entities involved as
well. Vineberg put it bluntly when she claimed accepting the best results
in science while denying abstract mathematical entities would be failing to
accept the consequences of affirming the truth of our scientific theories [27].
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The acceptance or denial of this argument comes down to a study of the
nature of mathematics, and in particular, how much explanatory power we
warrant pure mathematics. All it takes is scanning through any science text-
book to notice the prevalence of mathematics as support for all applications.
Mathematical anti-realists such as Benacerraf have tried to come up with
a science without mathematical algorithms or formulas. Even if this were
somehow possible, the resulting “science” would still be lacking something
crucial. As we shine this spotlight on the practice of science, we will see that
the picture offered by Benacerraf only accounts for a small piece of what we
consider the evolving field of science today. The complex relationships be-
tween mathematics and science are of utmost importance when studying The
Indispensability Argument. I want to look at some specific cases to illustrate
how this relationship should not be overlooked.
2.2 Mathematics Playing An Explanatory Role
First, let's explore how physical phenomena can be explained by science. The
following examples are of mathematical truths, rather than explanations that
merely utilize math. Alan Baker draws the distinction between representa-
tional mathematics and explanatory mathematics. Mathematical algorithms
represent large sets of data, whereas mathematical truths explain physical
phenomena. Baker quotes Mark Steiner noting that there are numerous in-
stances where “when we remove the physics, we remain with a mathematical
explanation of a mathematical truth!” [1]. The case of the North American
cicada demonstrates exactly what Steiner had in mind.
2.2.1 The North American Cicada
The life cycle of the North American cicada highlights a mathematical truth
about prime numbers. The cicada is a locust–like bug that buries its larvae in
the ground. These larvae resurface simultaneously after a period of 13 to 17
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years as mature bugs to mate, and die shortly afterwards. Although the life
cycle varies with climate, within a single population the number of years is
always synchronized. Concepts in number theory explain the ways this mass
emergence after a prime number of years can be advantageous to the species.
The periods of 13 and 17 years are notable, given that these numbers are not
only prime but consecutive primes. The notion of a least–common–multiple
(LCM) explains why cicada life cycles settled on these prime numbers and
how this is beneficial to the cicadas’ survival. The LCM of two numbers, x
and y, is the smallest possible number z, where x divides z and y divides z.
For example, the LCM of 3 and 4 is 12 because 3 divides 12 and 4 divides
12. When we have one prime number, the LCM of a prime and a composite
will be the prime number multiplied by the composite number unless the
composite number is divisible by the prime number. For cicadas, the LCM
explains how the prime–numbered life cycle results in a diminished risk of
being eaten by predators. The prime-numbered life cycle means that the
life cycles of most other species do not overlap with that of the cicada. For
example, the 13 year cycle cicada will be less likely to have intersections with
predators whose life cycles are any number other than 1 or 0mod13 . On the
other hand, if the cicada has a life cycle of 16 years we see that it intersects
with predators of life cycles of 1, 2, 4, and 8 years. This hypothetical cicada
life cycle would mean that a predator would have an increased chance of
being able to eat the cicadas when they emerge for about five weeks to mate.
The cicadas plant their larvae in the soil and then die after these brief weeks
of life above ground. Below is a diagram I made to illustrate the first ten
possible life cycles of predators and how they fail to overlap the primes in
question. The only numbers that interact with 13 and 17 are 13 and 17
themselves. The other numbers on the number line are relatively prime to
13 and 17. Notice that the cicada could have had the same evolutionary
advantage if their cycles were every 11 or 19 years. Biological factors, such
as body size, put the cicadas within this specific 13 or 17 year window. If we
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were dealing with a smaller cicada perhaps we would see it shift down to 11
or 13.
The notion of an LCM also explains how the cicada finds an evolutionary
advantage in avoiding other species by limiting the potential for hybridiza-
tion. The theory that prime numbers have the lowest–common–multiple pro-
vides the best explanation for the evolution of prime–numbered life cycles.
This theory comes from number theory, a realm of mathematics devoted to
numbers. The Indispensability Argument holds that we must acknowledge
the existence of any object that plays an indispensable explanatory role in
our scientific theorems. In the case of the cicada, we see that number theory
plays this role.
2.2.2 The Honeybee
Joe Morrison's talk, “The Ontological Extravagance of Honeybees,” presents
another example of mathematics playing an explanatory role in science. The
23
Honeycomb conjecture posits that bees solved a recondite problem, and have
thus made their cells the proper shape to contain the most amount of honey
using the least possible amount of wax in their construction. Bees solved this
problem using the tools given to them through evolution. We are not claiming
that these smart bees are mathematicians, only that they successfully solved
this efficiency problem in order to reap the benefits for their species. Given
one swarm of bees making a mathematically efficient honeycomb, and another
making their honeycomb with excess wax, the more proficient swarm will be
more likely to survive and pass on their wax-saving genes. Hypothetically,
if there were a beehive using a more efficient shape than the hexagon, then
the bees using the hexagon would eventually die out. Disregarding wax, the
problem at hand is one of geometrical optimization. In other words, what
shape has the largest surface area but the smallest possible perimeter?
This question dates back to 36 B.C., when Marcus Terentius Varro notes
how the bee's chamber has six angles and claims, “the geometrician proves
that this hexagon inscribed in the circular figure encloses the greatest amount
of space” [2]. Although we have been observing bees for thousands of years,
this honeycomb conjecture was not formalized until June 1999 by Thomas
C. Hales in his 24 page proof,“The Honeycomb Conjecture”. This may seem
shockingly late, considering bees solved the problem originally. Hales had to
use the notion of sphere packing in order to completely prove the conjecture
without employing the convexity hypothesis. Before 1999, the hexagonal
honeycomb conjecture was merely based on biological observation. Mathe-
matics served the role of making this observation more rigorous by unifying
the results without relying on our instinct about animal behavior and per-
haps our religious affiliation. The explanatory power of mathematics becomes
crucial for our understanding of the physical system of the bees, as well as
providing an attractive argument for evolution. Hexagons are shown to be
the most effective way to tile an area using the smallest perimeter by the
mathematical truth highlighted in the two different approaches.
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2.2.3 The Kirkwood Gaps
Kirkwood Gaps provide a final example of the power of explanatory math-
ematics. Daniel Kirkwood was the first person to notice the gaps in the
asteroid belt between Jupiter and Mars. These gaps initially confused many
scientists studying the orbits of these planets, however, by looking at the
eigenanalysis of the orbits involved they derived the precise location of these
gaps. The clearest gaps are dispersed at fractional orbit ratios of one-half,
two-thirds, two-fifths, and three-sevenths. It was later discovered that grav-
itational resonances cause Jupiter's orbit to be unstable. If an asteroid is in
these unstable orbits, it gets further and further off course until the asteroid
is adopted by a stable orbit.
Colyvan explains the varying level of mathematical involvement within
these Kirkwood gaps [10]. Starting with the less impressive case, we see eigen-
values of an operator identify the fraction of the unstable orbits compared to
Jupiter's orbit. These discoveries are important, but they fail to explain why
the Kirkwood gaps make it impossible for an asteroid to maintain a stable
gap. The noteworthy explanatory involvement comes when looking at the
relationship between the fractions through functional analysis. Through this
analysis, scientists have found that the orbits are unoccupied because the
vector operator squishes or stretches vectors. Colyvan notes that an asteroid
circles the sun three times for every one rotation of Jupiter, will thereby be
drawn into repeated interactions with Jupiter of a type to eventually pull
it off course [10]. The similarities between the orbits are mathematical and
not visibly physical, which means there is some mathematical truth hidden
within these gaps. Here, the notion of eigenvalues in the study of linear
algebra make it possible for us to understand a phenomenon happening in
space. Without studying these orbits with mathematical rigor, these gaps in
the asteroid belt would remain a mystery since there is no strictly physical
explanation for their existence.
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2.3 Scientific Discovery and Development
In all three of these cases, the explanatory connection is purely mathematical
which makes it arguably impossible for scientists to explain the phenomena
without mathematics. Thus, the practice of science goes beyond reading
physical results, and in these cases the explanation requires an appeal to
mathematical truth. When nominalists try to refute cases such as these,
they miss out on the deep importance of mathematics in explaining the world.
This lack of attention to explanatory power is the first mistake seen in the
nominalists’ attack. Alan Baker brings to light the second mistake, as he
introduces the ideas of scientific development and scientific discovery.
We can clearly point to cases in science that suggest further mathematical
innovations, such as Fourier analysis, however, more often than not, it is the
formalization of mathematics that suggests the development of new physical
theories [2]. The symbiotic relationship of calculus and mechanics provides
a clear, somewhat controversial, example of this. Another example applies
formal group theory to particle physics, which lets us predict the activity of
entire families of unobservable subatomic particles [2]. Nominalism focuses
their attention on a transection of a stagnant point in the history of science,
which is not an adequate sample based on how science moves forwards hand
in hand with mathematics. John Burgess goes so far as to say that if science
goes nominalistic, that future science may never be discovered. As far as the
nominalist successfully reformats specific examples, it is still a reformation
that would not exist without the original platonistic account.
The nature of scientific discovery gives us further reason to discount nomi-
nalism. Baker underlines the distinction between proof verification and proof
discovery, which helps us view mathematical practice through a new lens.
Proof verification stems from the desire to verify something that is already
known. In this kind of proof with a predetermined conclusion, the math-
ematician needs only to arrange the premises accordingly. Euler's totient
function is an example of proof verification, and it follows from the funda-
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mental theorem of arithmetic. This kind of proof creates lines connecting
existing mathematics to help unify results in various fields. On the other
hand, proof discovery is the type of proof that arrives at a previously un-
known truth by combining previously known axioms and theorems. This
distinction between mathematical proofs is not taken into consideration by
nominalism.
2.3.1 Asymmetry In Cryptography
A great example of how this asymmetry can be exploited is seen in cryptog-
raphy. One of the main coding systems used to transfer secret information is
called the Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Baker and Colyvan focus on another
public key system called RSA, however, Diffie–Hellman is slightly more user
friendly. The Diffie–Hellman system is created to make encoding the message
as easy as possible and makes decoding the message as hard as possible. Con-
sider an interaction between two colleagues Adam and Beth, they are trying
to share a secret without Eve knowing. They start with a public prime, let’s
use 67 with a public base of the primitive root 7. Adam chooses a secret
integer a=6, and calculates A ≡ 7a mod 67, which is equal to 64. Now Beth
does the same calculation but with her own secret integer b=3, she gets B=8,
then she send this to Adam. Now Adam computes s ≡ Ba mod 67 with his
secret a, and gets the number 40. Beth also computes s ≡ Ab mod 67 with
her secret b and also gets 40. This number, 40, is the shared secret between
Adam and Beth that Eve does not know. In the NSA they are using much
larger base prime numbers, however, even with this example the decoding is
non–trivially difficult. This is thanks to the (hopefully forever) unsolvable
discrete logarithm problem (I say hopefully forever because if it were to be
solved our world would go to shambles.) In this example Eve could feasibly
try all possible private keys, however, to decode the typical problem is im-
possible for the best modern supercomputers to do in a reasonable amount of
time. For example, the typical time to factor a 100–digit product is around 60
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years. Considering how simple it is to encode one of these crypto–systems,
this is remarkable. Baker notes that in this example the encoding of the
message is similar to verification and the decoding is analogous to discovery.
The proof discovery relates to the mathematical truth about the difficultly
to decode the discrete logarithm problem.
This mathematical disconnect shows that it is unwise to treat all mathe-
matical problems with the same philosophical attitude. Baker claims “if the
resources needed for proof discovery exceed those required for proof verifica-
tion then mathematics might be dispensable for the latter task without being
dispensable for the former one” [2] When examining The Indispensability Ar-
gument, it is possible that some rebuttals only capture a narrow segment of
mathematical results. Even if proponents for nominalism could show the
dispensability for mathematics in proof verification, it is not the case that
this would translate to mathematics being dispensable to the discovery of
new results in science [2]. For example, if nominalists such as Benacerraf can
recreate scientific theorems without using numbers, it does not mean that
the mathematics originally involved with discovery are dispensable to the
theory. Mathematics can be responsible for the development and evolution
of the theory in ways that cannot be replicated. Baker urges philosophers
studying mathematics and science to stop focusing on the static aspect of
theories and try to look at the larger picture of how science moves forward.
2.3.2 A History of Complex Numbers
At first glance, a static view of the complex number system looks like non-
sense. What was once considered a mathematical trick of working with
√−x,
now complex calculus is applied to control theory, fluid dynamics, electro-
magnetism and electrical engineering. Complex numbers have a rather con-
troversial history. The applicability of complex numbers in physical theories
has contributed to the unification of previously distinct mathematical fields,
and ultimately the unification of mathematics and science. For years math-
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ematicians refused to believe in these numbers which caused tension within
the community. However, after they were geometrically represented, people
were somewhat less hesitant. Descartes famously coined these numbers as
“imaginary,” claiming “one can imagine as many as I said in each equation,
but sometimes there exists no quantity that matches that which we imagine?”
[12].
The unifying nature of complex numbers make them of utmost impor-
tance to the philosopher. Demonstrating the symmetrical nature of math-
ematics, complex numbers built the bridge between pure mathematics and
applied mathematics. Colyvan claims that complex numbers had their finest
hour when they were used to solve real integrals that could not be solved with
the integration techniques available [9]. In calculus a student learns a hand-
ful of tricks when faced with an integral. There are certain cases where the
only way to solve the integral by hand is through Euler's formula. It seems
strange at first to complicate the integral by introducing complex variables,
however, the identities of the trigonometric functions uncover aspects of the
integral that were initially hidden.
Euler's formula is also used in second order differential equations acting as
a middle step in the analysis of real (real as in not complex) functions. Here,
complex numbers are a tool to unify exponential and trigonometric functions.
Colyvan points to an example in differential equations that segues nicely into
the physical application of the system. He defines the complex numbers as an
extension of the typical operations in the reals with the addition of i =
√
(−1)
Complex exponentiation leans on Euler's formula, e±iθ = cos θ± i sin θ where
θ ∈ R. This identity can be reworked to solve for sine and cosine in terms of
the complex variable, z. These equations look like this,
sin z =
eiz − e−iz
2i
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cos z =
eiz + e−iz
2
This rewriting of the sine and cosine functions shows that trigonometry in the
reals is a specific case of a larger area. This coexistence of the exponential and
trigonometric functions enables us to proceed gracefully with solving second-
order differential equations. The applications of second-order differential
equations in physics and engineering are impressive. A typical second-order
linear homogeneous ordinary differential equation with constant coefficients
takes the form, y”+ y’+y=0. I will proceed with a slightly more complicated
example from the textbook “Differential Equations” by Paul Blanchard [4].
1. We want to solve
y′′ + 4y′ + 13y = 0 (1)
2. We assume that y = ert is a solution, so we have
y′ = rert and y′′ = r2ert (2)
3. Now, we substitute these back into the original equation
r2ert − 4rert + 13ert = 0 (3)
4. Now we divide by ert
r2 − 4r + 13 = 0 (4)
5. This quadratic doesn't factor, therefore we turn to to quadratic formula
to find the roots
r = 2 + 3i and r = 2− 3i (5)
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6. We conclude the general solution to our differential equation is
y = a1e
(2+3i)t + a2e
(2−3i)t Substitution (6)
y = a1e
2te3it + a2e
2te−3it Rule of Exponents (7)
y = e2t(a1e
3it + a2e
−3it) Factoring out the e2t (8)
7. This general solution involves complex exponents. We must use Euler's
Formula to find the real answer. We find that
y = e2t[a1(cos(3t) + i sin(3t)) + a2(cos(−3t) + i sin(−3t))] (9)
y = e2t[(a1 + a2) cos(3t) + (a1 − a2)i sin(3t)] (10)
8. Now we let
c1 = a1 + a2 and c2 = i(a1 − a2) (11)
9. Substitute these in to get the final answer
y = e2t[c1 cos(3t) + c2 sin(3t)] (12)
This example shows how we use complex numbers to get to a real an-
swer. Euler's formula acts as the bridge between these two areas. This kind
of differential problem is indispensable in order to explain physical phenom-
ena in fluid mechanics, heat conduction, and to analyze population models.
This elementary differential equations problem indicates the deeper nature
of complex numbers. Imaginary numbers were thought to be entirely unreal,
until they proved so useful in describing the structure of space. The intro-
duction of complex variables help illuminate the underlying structure of the
mathematical truths at play.
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2.3.3 The Utility of Quaternions
Alongside the rigorization of the complex numbers, quaternions provide an-
other great illustration of the complicated relationship between math and
science. This case study given by Alan Baker and others illuminates the im-
portance of utility when declaring a theorem as acceptable. In 1843 William
Rowan Hamilton was on a quest for a three dimensional extension of com-
plex numbers with the form x + yi + zj. He was particularly drawn to this
form because he saw the possibility of it being used in physics for modeling
of actual three dimensional space. He was unable to find such a framework,
however, along the way he did discover a four dimensional extension of the
complex numbers, quaternions. Quaternions are made up of three vector
components, xi, yj, and zk, and one scalar element, w. These four compo-
nents, w+xi+yj+zk, compose an associative but non commutative vectorial
system.
This distinction between associativity and commutativity enabled quater-
nions to set the stage for algebra as a separate and rigorous field in math-
ematics. This system was the first to show there could exist a system that
gives up commutativity without becoming trivial. This idea paved the road
for division algebras, a whole scheme of algebraic structures which each have
two operations. In addition to algebraic uses, quaternions were used in num-
ber theory to represent prime numbers as a sum of two squares. Quaternions
helped introduce the contemporary system of vectors and scalars seen in most
fields of mathematics and physics. When we consider a quaternion with a
scalar part equal to zero, xi+yj+zk, we see how similar it is to the structure
of a modern vector. Hamilton held a persistent geometrical lens throughout
his mathematical infatuation with quaternions. Baker points out that he
made the multiplication requirement for them to satisfy the ‘law of moduli’
which guarantees that every multiplication also has an inverse multiplication
[2].
This geometrical side of quaternions made them a plausible tool for physi-
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cal applications, but they never became the tool Hamilton had hoped. To his
dismay, the specific geometric interpretation, particularly the rotation of the
vector and the conical rotations, made quaternions an undesirable choice for
physicists. Before quaternions were completely replaced by modern vectors,
they were used for their transparency compared to Cartesian coordinates
(Tait, 1875). The vector offered many benefits for scientists, and eventu-
ally pushed quaternions out of the picture. These benefits stem mostly from
the intuitions of physicists being drawn to vector spaces. Specifically, the
separation between the scalar and vector parts make it easier to formulate
theories.
The case of quaternions is crucial to unpacking notions of indispensabil-
ity. This study opens up a new sense of mathematics and how it relates
to our progressive scientific theories. Strictly speaking, quaternions are not
indispensable to any of our modern scientific theories – but they are indis-
pensable to the history of physics and that is perhaps more powerful. The
fault of quaternions in algebra was a gain for vectors in physics, and without
this teeter totter of utility we would not be where we are today in physics.
The road for quaternions, somewhat surprisingly, is not a dead end after-
all. Quaternions were left in the dust due to their four dimensionality and
their non-commutativity, allowing the modern vector to be the phoenix from
their ashes. However, these faults were considered virtues when applied to
Einstein's theories of special relativity and quantum mechanics. For the first
time we begin to see the deductive indispensability of quaternions in physics.
This fuels Baker's conversation about distinguishing indispensability and
deductive indispensability. Baker notes that this distinction has remain ig-
nored by many philosophers, however, in light of the next section it is crucial
to understand. He points to an example within the history of infinitesimals.
Baker asks if infinitesimals were previously shown to be deductively dis-
pensable before Cauchy, why were infinitesimals not dispensed by later 18th
century mathematicians? [2]. This is a misunderstanding within the utility
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of infinitesimals. Although quaternions were not deductively indispensable
to science they were completely indispensable for the discovery of unknown
results [2].
The four dimensionality of quaternions was embraced by the development
of special relativity. To model special relativity scientists needed something
that would show the divide between the two spacetime points and the spa-
tial separation minus the temporal separation. The norm of the real valued
quaternion provided the perfect reformulation of special relativity [2]. Per-
haps more impressive, the silver lining of the non-commutativity in quater-
nions is seen when they are applied to quantum mechanics. The application of
quaternions to quantum mechanics has not only reformulated the theory but
has unsurfaced other implications that go beyond the theory without quater-
nions. This is when this mathematics becomes indispensable to our scientific
theory. Douglas Sweetser describes why quaternions are especially indispens-
able in quantum mechanics in his paper, “Doing Physics With Quaternions.”
The product of a quaternion transpose with another quaternion has the dis-
tinct property of a complete inner–product space. When applied to calcu-
lating the tensor product in quantum mechanics, the non–commutativity of
quaternions ensure dependent results. This means that in any two systems
of quaternionic quantum mechanics there will be a complementarity between
some of the properties in the systems [2].
On the surface this might not seem like a groundbreaking discovery, but
the fact that quaternions uncover a truth about the impossibility of indepen-
dence of two systems is remarkable. This truth is brought to light by the
properties of quaternions, specifically their non–commutativity. In this ex-
ample, our choice of formalizing quantum mechanics with quaternions made
it possible to further understand the structure of the physical reality at play.
Quaternions prove to be deductively indispensable to our theory of quantum
mechanics.
The hot and cold history of quaternions introduces an idea about scien-
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tific progress that is crucial to the study of indispensability. If quaternions
were completely thrown out and replaced with vectors we would see quantum
mechanics less clearly. With the exponential growth of scientific progress it
is impossible to claim that a dispensable mathematical entity will always
remain dispensable. The account for why quaternions were dispensable to
early physics, specifically their non-commutativity and their four dimension-
ality, was precisely the reason why they became indispensable to quantum
mechanics years later.
2.4 Questions About Indispensability: The Worries of
Penelope Maddy
These examples give fruitful reasons to believe in The Indispensability Ar-
gument. However, there are important questions about the theory that have
yet to be completely developed. Geometrical analysis, number theory, linear
algebra, eigenanalysis, functional analysis, and complex analysis are some
of the areas that look promising through an understanding of mathematics
through science development and discovery. Penelope Maddy strategically
rejects both of the premises of The Indispensability Argument but it is un-
clear if she is able to account for the explanatory power of mathematics we
have discussed. Once we become familiarized with Maddy's objections we
will investigate possible counterarguments. Maddy, once an eager mathe-
matical realist, points to the practice of scientists and draws out a potential
disconnect between naturalism and confirmational holism.
Her first objection is primarily given in her 1992 paper, “Indispensability
and Practice,” and then made more concrete in her paper, “Taking Nat-
uralism Seriously.” She appeals to the practice of scientists claiming that
how they treat separate components of well–confirmed theories is rarely how
confirmation holism would predict. The nature of science is to take the past
discoveries and try to see it through a new lens until eventually we have a
new system to better represent our world. Maddy provides an example about
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atomic theory, which was not accepted as true until the beginning of the 20th
century through scientific justification. She claims that the majority of sci-
entists remained skeptical of atomic theory although it was well-confirmed
as early as 1860 [21]. Scientists remained comfortable with believing directly
verifiable results from atomic theory as they weighed on their direct theory
without believing in the atom's existence. In the case of a specific theory
they granted the atom, however, they were not confirming the existence of
the atom at large. Maddy sees this situation as disagreeing with Quine's
confirmation holism because if he was correct then the scientist should have
accepted the atom's existence the moment it became indispensable to their
theories. In reality, scientists remained skeptical about the existence of atoms
until as late as 1904 although atoms became indispensable to science around
1860 [9].
There is minimal leeway within this observation looking at Putnam and
Quine's next premise, naturalism. Naturalism grants that we must lean on
the working scientist and in this case the working scientist is giving us reason
to reject the first premise. The inspection of the scientist in this situation
indicates that they do not grant the existence of all entities proposed by
our best theories. Maddy's next issue arises from the previous rejection of
confirmation holism. If we no longer can regard a scientific theory as a
homogenous element, there is a the possibility that the mathematical section
of the theory is untrue. Maddy calls this into question claiming that it is up in
the air whether the mathematical portions of the scientific theory correspond
with the true parts of the confirmed theories [21]. She uses an example in
fluid dynamics to show an incorrect use of indispensability in hypotheses that
are purposely incorrect. Scientists provoke the premise a body of water is
infinitely deep in order to analyse water waves in fluid dynamics. Maddy
claims that these theories would be nonexistent without these unreasonable
hypotheses, and are therefore indispensable to the theories they produce.
It would be ill–advised to take this appearance in our best theory about
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water waves as sufficient reason to believe in infinity [21]. Maddy notices
that scientists seem to use whatever mathematics they need to use to get
the most accurate answer, even if the mathematics does not have ontological
rights within the theory.
These rejections clearly do not sit well with The Indispensability Argu-
ment. Not only has Maddy pointed to errors in the thesis, she actually used
one of the premises to refute the other premise. However, platonism should
not give up quite so soon.
2.5 Colyvan Responds to Maddy
Mark Colyvan gives a coherent response to each of Maddy's issues with the
argument. Starting with the first appeal to the practice of scientists, Colyvan
tries to undercut Maddy's idea that scientists distinguish between fake and
real entities in their theories. The first case is when the fictitious element is
introduced to the theory as purposefully inconsistent. Colyvan gives a few
examples, such as frictionless planes or inertial reference frames. He then
claims that although these ideas are useful to the hypothetical situation, there
must be a better way to theorize that is consistent with the other axioms at
hand. The fact that scientists are hypothesizing with an inconsistent idea
means that it is not the best possible practice to get at the truth of the
system. In the case of the infinitely deep water example, we do not need to
warrant the existence of the false hypothesis because we are not taking the
literal truth of the entire theory.
The next case is illustrated by Maddy's previous observation of the atom.
This issue occurs when scientists treat an object instrumentally that is in fact
indispensable to the best theory. Colyvan retraces Maddy's steps and points
out a misunderstanding of Quinean naturalism. Maddy wants to observe the
Quinean notion that the philosopher overlooking science must second the
ontological conclusions of science. However this is inconsistent with how she
formalizes her ideas of naturalism, because she does not hold that natural-
37
ism prohibits all philosophical commentary of natural methodology. Colyvan
claims that, “once this misconception is cleared up we see that the door is
open for a critique of the sceptical scientists from a philosophical perspective
located within the scientific enterprise” [10]. Colyvan selects Hilary Putnam
to be the displeased philosopher and looks to Putnam’s definition of “intel-
lectual dishonesty”. Putnam says to deny the existence of what one daily
presupposes is intellectual dishonesty. In the case of the atom it is dishon-
est for the chemist to use these entities without granting that they exist.
This doesn't mean that it is impossible for them to do so, however, it is
an intellectual crime. It is impossible to know the motives behind scientists
who suspended the existence of atoms, but from a Quinean point of view
they were doing something wrong. Colyvan understands initial hesitation
or skepticism to new objects, but after they become indispensable it seems
worrisome to deny their existence. Colyvan then mentions another facet of
Quine's thesis. This thesis is not a descriptive thesis about how science is or
has been, it is a normative proposition about how we ought to decide our on-
tological commitments [10]. Quine is not committed to the history of science
being unflawed, and in this case of the atom it seems like a human flaw that
could be explain by various personal reasons and preferences. Consequently,
this can not be seen as a real issue when surveying the practice of science.
Maddy argues that scientists use mathematics as a means to an end with-
out considering the ontology of the mathematics in question. Colyvan notes
that in examples of such negligence, the mathematics has already been widely
used within the theory. Scientists do take caution when the they are working
with mathematics that is being applied for the first time. This can be seen in
the previous example of complex numbers. Mathematicians did not accept
their existence until they were mentioned by Guass’ fundamental theorem of
algebra and then used successfully in modeling physical structures that were
otherwise unapproachable. As well as in the early stages of the calculus,
where the hesitation within applying the math was raised from the ques-
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tionable use of the infinitesimal. Berkeley, as well as other mathematicians,
were unconvinced that the calculus as proposed by Leibniz and Newton had
consistent foundations. Colyvan gives an example Dirac's equation with the
introduction of the delta function. Dirac knew this equation would cause a
controversy based on its improper function. Along with his rigorization of the
equation he wrote a sort of “users guide” to his equation claiming that there
was a ontologically correct version of this equation, however, the solution
becomes more salient with the given equation [10]. Here, the mathematician
gives a philosophical warning in correlation to his theory. If Maddy is right
in thinking mathematicians are not bothered by the philosophy they invoke,
then we would not see Dirac's warning.
There is, however, a more concerning objection to account for in Coly-
van's response. Maddy raises the idea that mathematical practice does not
mirror mathematical realism as explained by The Indispensability Argument.
Colyvan's rebuttal uses the account of holism given by Quine, and claims that
Maddy is misunderstanding Quine's intentions. Maddy notices a disconnect
between mathematical practice and scientific practice. Mathematicians do
not commit themselves to theorems because of their utility; they believe
the theorems based on the provability from given axioms. Colyvan draws a
distinction between two types of belief to put at the background of Maddy's
worry. When mathematicians assign truth to a theorem they are doing so be-
cause the theorem is in accordance to the other true axioms that contributed.
Colyvan claims that there is no ontological grounds until the mathematical
claim is rendered useful to empirical science [9]. The workings of pure mathe-
maticians should not be concerned with the ontological commitments of their
theories until they are applied as indispensable to empirical observations.
This seems right, however, Maddy claims this leaves a great deal of math-
ematics unaccounted for [21]. If we are only ontologically committed to the
mathematics that makes the way into the empirical sciences it seems as
though The Indispensability Argument isn't as strong as we once thought.
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As we have seen in this survey of indispensability, there is not specific indi-
cation that a mathematical theorem will become indispensable. Therefore, it
seems like we should allow the possibility for all mathematics to eventually
be applicable to empirical findings. There are constantly branches of math-
ematics becoming linked by the discovery of hidden connections. However,
Quine does raise the question of mathematical recreation, and claims some
abstract branches of mathematics are considered to be without ontological
rights according to The Indispensability Argument. This doesn't mean that
mathematicians are misguided in continuing to pursue such abstract avenues.
As we saw with complex numbers, mathematicians were not considering the
possibility of them being mapped onto Euclidean space. The mathematicians
in this example were not committed to the entities in their results, but even-
tually there became a reason to be committed to complex numbers. In this
example mathematical recreation was shown to be increasingly important
as complex analysis became more rigorous. Maddy misunderstands mathe-
matical practice in this way and thinks we must endorse ontological rights
to all mathematical entities in order for them to relevant. The practice of
mathematicians illustrates their faith that the underlying current of mathe-
matical patterns will eventually tie the theory together. Perhaps this does
not happen in the majority of mathematical pursuits. The few times these
miraculous connections are found gives enough reason to endorse mathemat-
ical recreation as a worthy endeavor.
3 Newtonian Cosmology and Inconsistent In-
finite Sums
3.1 An Introduction To Newtonian Cosmology
Newtonian Cosmology possibly contributes an argument against indispens-
ability that has not been touched on by Penelope Maddy. Thus far, each case
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study illustrates the power of mathematics to push scientific discovery and
development further. In some cases the progress of science has demanded
more rigorous mathematics to formalize the results. When we don't react to
the demand we see examples of unsuitable mathematics that fails to stabilize
scientific theory. Broadly speaking, this is what happened for two–hundred
years with Newtonian Cosmology. The controversies embedded within New-
tonian Cosmology are numerous from a physicist's standpoint. In John D.
Norton's paper, “The Cosmological Woes of Newtonian Gravitation The-
ory”, he points to a handful of issues within the theory that are mutually
inconsistent. My focus will be how the theory deals with infinite sums, and
more specifically, how some results require one outcome and other results re-
quire the opposite outcome. Our incomplete understanding of infinite sums
lead us to overlook important results in the study of time evolution and the
expansion of our universe.
Newtonian Cosmology describes the evolution of the universe exclusively
using the language of Newtonian Dynamics. Newtonian Dynamics is the
study of a particle as stated by Newton's laws of motion. In 1687, New-
ton devised an impressive picture of universe in his work “Principia” . He
described an infinite universe with gravitational balance and uniformly dis-
tributed matter. This was remarkably advanced for his time and set the stage
for many fields of science for years to come. The main question considered
by Newtonian Cosmology aims to find the net gravitational force of a given
test particle at any arbitrary place in the universe [26]. In order to attempt
a solution scientists use a combination of Newton's law of gravitation, Pois-
son's equation, and considerations of symmetry and gravitational potential.
Through this approach, inconsistencies arise.
Peter Vickers is particularly interested in understanding the nature of
these inconsistencies. His book “Understanding Inconsistent Science” points
to Newtonian Cosmology as an exemplification of a particular type of math-
ematical error leading science. He claims there are two main types of con-
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tradictions in this theory. Primarily, there is the kind of contradiction that
arises when the force of a specific test particle is both X and Y where X 6= Y
The other notable contradiction surfaces when the force on the particle is
both determinate and indeterminate. The bulk of the mathematical interest
resides in the second kind of contradiction. Vickers calls the contradiction
C5 in his book, where C5 is “it is the case that there is a unique gravitational
force on a test mass and it is not the case that there is a unique gravitational
force of a test mass.” I will call the first part of C5, P, and the second part
6= P. If the larger theory was consistent it would be impossible to derive both
P and 6= P.
These conclusions follow from applying Newton's three laws of motion,
Newton's inverse square law of gravitation, and the fact that in an infinite
Euclidean space matter is distributed isotropically and homogeneously. The
issue can be seen through applying each of these aforementioned laws to arrive
at the conclusion that the net force on a given test mass is undetermined.
However, it is an axiom of Newton's three laws of motion that there is always
a determinate force on a body. Simply by looking at Newton's inverse square
law of gravitation and the fact about matter we get an indeterminate infinite
sum. The mistake is to take this infinite sum as meaning there is no unique
gravitational force on the test mass. It could simply mean that using the
inverse square law and the fact about matter are not the right means to
determine what the force is. Scientists can either take indeterminacy as
meaning no solution has been reached or that there is no solution.
3.2 Infinite Sums
The possibility of arriving at a contradiction depends on how one handles
the indeterminate sum. This fact was exploited by early scientists fond of
Newtonian Cosmology. If we take this infinite sum to mean that there is
some solution that has yet to be discovered, then we have a consistent theory.
However, if the indefinite sum is inferred as no possible solution, then we have
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a contradiction to the laws of motion. It wasn't until two hundred years later
that Cauchy showed that the contradiction-free application was the wrong
way to deal with infinite sums.
Cauchy proved that when faced with an indeterminate sum there exists
no solution. When faced with indeterminacy the only correct way to proceed
is to conclude there is no solution. Overlooking this result in cosmology is
nothing less than a metaphysical error. Scientists used incorrect mathemat-
ics to grasp a metaphysical understanding of forces in the universe. The
mathematics was inconsistent, in turn causing inconsistencies in the meta-
physical conclusions. Therefore, our conclusions about physical properties in
the universe rely on a complete understanding of infinite sums.
This illustrates one of the issues that can arise when scientists use incon-
sistent mathematics as indispensable to their physical theories. The under-
lying structure of infinite sums points to a truth in cosmology that would
have gone unnoticed using the incorrect framework. In other words, without
understanding the actual structure of these infinite sums our cosmological
truths are inconsistent. The indispensability of mathematical truths govern
the consistency of our theories, and in this case we only got so far because
we were not reading the infinite sums correctly. Perhaps without surprise,
this is not the only time failing to understand infinity caused issues when ap-
plying mathematics. Infinity is prone to inconsistency, and before Cantor's
proof regarding cardinality, mathematics concerning the size of infinity was
inconsistent.
3.3 Applying Inconsistent Mathematics
The case of Newtonian Cosmology illustrates issues within the empirical sci-
ences that arise based on mathematical error. This error was not trivial
because there was not yet a clear understanding of how to approach infinite
sums. Two hundred years later, this issue was ironed out with the help of
Cauchy in his convergence test. There are cases where the inconsistent math-
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ematics is impossible to iron out, leaving the physical problems at a stand
still. Most of these situations stem from known paradoxes in mathematics
that when applied to physical systems cause inconsistency.
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, previously outlined in section 1.2.3,
exemplifies that some mathematical statements are simply undecided. This
proof caused many mathematicians, including Godel himself, to enter ex-
treme existential crisis. Hilbert, and other mathematicians looking for a
complete system of logic, were shocked to realize that any system they ever
developed would rest on at least some assumptions that are unprovable.
The example of the machine in 1.2.3 illustrates the theorem’s obvious im-
plications to artificial intelligence. Alan Turing was the first person to take
Godel's work and apply it to the physical world. In an article from late last
year Davide Castelvecchi reported on unanswerable physical problems based
on this paradox given by Godel.
Condensed matter theory is one field where such unanswerable physical
problems have surfaced. Scientists have tried to understand the gaps between
the lowest energy levels of electrons in a given material. Using an idealized
model of the atoms, scientists have found that it is impossible to calculate this
property. Toby Cubitt, a quantum physicist, stumbled upon this result while
studying spectral gaps between electrons. His research was focused on the gap
between the two lowest energy levels that electrons occupy within a material.
This is an especially important layer because in some materials, this gap is
the determining factor of the material becoming a superconductor [7]. The
researchers devised a theoretical model of an infinite two dimensional “crystal
lattice of atoms” [7]. In this model, the “quantum states of the atoms in the
lattice embody a Turing machine, containing the information for each step
of a computation to find the material’s spectral gap” [7] The issue occurred
when Cubitt saw that for this kind of infinite lattice, it is impossible to see
whether the calculation ends or the gap remains undecided. The team found
that on a finite lattice the calculation was always finite, however, because
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of the possible undecidability with the infinite lattice, they cannot draw any
general conclusions about the spectral gap. This question about infinity is
problematic because it introduces the possibility of an abrupt change within
the gap that cannot be accounted for.
Cubitt claims that this is the case with quite a few problems of mat-
ter theory. He points to a few examples that currently are getting massive
mathematical attention and claims there is the great possibility that they
are unanswerable. For example, the Yang–Mills mass-gap problem has been
posed by the Clay Institute with a multi–million dollar prize attached to the
solution. This type of problem stems from the inaccuracy of our current
system when dealing with why force–carriers have mass while photons are
massless. This case is of particular interest because the scientists in question
would not know what to do with such a result, if Godel had not proven his
Incompleteness Theorems. In this example, inconsistent mathematics proved
to be indispensable to our theories about matter. “Undecided” as a possi-
ble scientific result came from Godel?s earth-shattering mathematical proof.
Mathematics is typically appealed to for problem solving, however, in this
case we see how a truth of mathematics actually creates undecidability for
the sciences.
This understood undecidability in the sciences is based on the undecid-
ability result illustrated by Godel. Godel's proof allows scientists to remain
calm when an experiment yields “undecided”. This ties into the conversation
of inconsistency because we can see how science does not simply decide to
be modeled by the best conclusive and consistent mathematics. This fur-
ther reinforces the value of studying these typically forbidden areas within
mathematics and science for further results.
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4 The Worry of Inconsistency
Inconsistent mathematics is the branch of mathematics of non-classical logic
that can tolerate the presence of a contradiction without turning every sen-
tence into a theorem [23]. This definition provides a nice starting point, since
clearly the mathematician is going to have to introduce a way to reform the
existing logical structure. Francisco Miro Quesada introduced the logical ba-
sis called paraconsistent logic. Broadly speaking, this inconsistency–tolerant
system allows certain mathematics to have some inconsistency without being
completely disregarded. An inconsistency in number theory would entail a
theorem claiming X and another theorem claiming ∼X simultaneously. As if
this situation weren't enough of a quandary, we must also note the ontology
of the objects at hand: more specifically, that the objects in question are
consequently inconsistent due to governance by inconsistent theorems.
A perceived strength of mathematics is that the mathematical world is
considered to be free from uncertainty. We like to hold math to this standard,
as the subject where there is always a “right” and a “wrong”; unfortunately,
the picture is slightly more muddled than early logicians may have hoped.
The formalist goes so far to claim that in order for a mathematical structure
to be considered as an object of study, it must be consistent. The platonist,
however, might be in trouble if they are willing to take inconsistent mathe-
matics seriously. According to The Indispensability Argument, they would
have to also occasionally accept the existence of inconsistent objects, which
is more philosophically troubling than the acceptance of abstract objects.
Platonist must possess a firm understanding of where the indispensability
thesis leaves them with inconsistent mathematics. A look at specific incon-
sistencies provides a better understanding of their place within the landscape
of mathematical practice and the field of mathematics more broadly.
A glance at the history of mathematics is sufficient to understand the
value of critically considering inconsistent mathematics. There are two cases
of inconsistencies that need approaching. Primarily the inconsistencies that
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are apparent to the mathematicians. This kind of inconsistency is illustrated
by Dirac providing mathematicians with a warning of the inconsistency issues
within his equation. Another, more controversial example, can be seen in
the early calculus when one proof uses two different notions of convergence.
The second kind of inconsistency is seen when the mathematicians do not
realize the inherent flaws in their theory. Seeing as there are times when we
don't know when things are inconsistent we should have a way to deal with
it philosophically before the inconsistency emerges. Pre–paradox naive–set
theory is, of course, the notorious case of this strain of inconsistency. I want
to focus on the overall application of inconsistent mathematics to see how
inconsistencies weigh on the philosophy of mathematics as a whole.
4.1 Inconsistent Calculus
The Indispensability Argument is arguably the only reason to take mathe-
matical platonism as a possibility. If this is the primary reason to believe
in mathematical objects, then we believe in the existence of the objects in-
dispensable to our best scientific theories. What if our best scientific theory
involves inconsistent mathematics? If the reason is as stated above, then we
have the same justification for inconsistent mathematics as we do for consis-
tent mathematics. Colyvan illustrates this point nicely with the somewhat
obvious example of the early calculus. The calculus, proposed by Leibniz and
Newton, was inconsistent in a few ways. Primarily, the partial understanding
of infinitesimals made it seem acceptable to write equations like this, a = a
+ δ, where δ is a changing quantity [9]. It should be noted that this equation
was actually the submitted revision for a more problematic mistake. Newton
advised the above equation as a way to get rid of the issue seen when we
divide by an infinitesimal, where sometimes the infinitesimal was treated like
zero and other times as a fixed quantity. Early calculus required equations
like the one above in order to capture the basic structure of changing quan-
tities. However, clearly a = a + δ is an inconsistent function because when
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δ is anything other than zero we get a false equation.
Eventually, calculus was put on a firm basis by Lagrange, Cauchy, Bolzano,
and Weierstrass. Lagrange was the first person to realize that algebra would
be an ideal base for calculus because it included infinite products and series
without the necessary appeal to the derivative using  and ρ notation. He
used the coefficients of Taylor Series expansions to find derivatives. Cauchy
then offered the revolutionary insight of the limit. He described how the
rigorous foundations of the limit could account for the integral, infinite se-
ries, the derivative, and continuity. Weierstrass formally proved Cauchy's
findings in the 1870's completing the improved calculus [13]. The main issue
with this history is the fact that for over 150 years the inconsistent version of
the calculus was being applied in all different areas. During this time, using
calculus helped us understand the effects of changes in systems in economy,
engineering, science, architecture, and more.
If we are taking The Indispensability Argument seriously, this poses quite
a big problem, perhaps even larger than the issues raised by Penelope Maddy
in section 2.4. To grant the existence of certain mathematical entities based
on their apparent indispensability to science is an issue in the case of the
early calculus. From the beginning of calculus up until 1873 we were com-
mitted to the existence of inconsistent objects. If one desires to argue against
this commitment to inconsistency in this case, the reasons to believe in the
indispensability of other consistent entities falls through simultaneously. An
argument claiming that such inconsistent theories cannot be suitable for our
best theories would go against naturalism and the appeal to the working sci-
entist. People in favor of The Indispensability Argument need to understand
the possible consequences of such a claim in mathematical ontology. It is
subject beyond the scope of this paper but worthy of further inquiry.
This is not to say these inconsistent commitments force the platonist
to immediately adopt inconsistent mathematics. We have seen cases where
the mathematicians in question have not realized that they are committed
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to inconsistent objects. In the case of Newtonian Cosmology, scientists were
indeed committed to two inconsistent theories which called for an adjustment
of their overall theory. This case might initially look troublesome to the
platonist, however, if there are two contradictory ideas in a theory we can still
see a reason to believe in the existence of mathematical entities. Newtonian
Cosmology was committed to there being either the entities on one side of the
inconsistency or the entities on the other side of the inconsistency. Perhaps
in the future it becomes clear that they are only justified in committing to
the consistent side, and then dispel the necessity of the inconsistency. This
illustrates the desire to iron out inconsistency eventually. The commitment
to inconsistent objects might be uncalled for in certain cases because the
platonist still is getting what they need to move forward.
4.2 Paraconsistent Logic
Colyvan makes controversial inferences from mathematical practice, however
he considers inconsistencies in mathematics more than other philosophers in
favor of platonism. It is suffice to say that neither nominalism nor platonism
is comfortable committing to the existence of inconsistent objects. Colyvan
argues that when faced with the question about the ontological commitments
of an inconsistent theory we must embrace paraconsistent logic. Without
paraconsistent logic we implore classical logic where from an inconsistency
comes trivialism: where everything is true. Furthermore, this trivialism can
be set within an indispensable theory which means that it can be shown
using classical logic that anything exists.
1. h = 0 ∧ h 6= 0 (Assumption)
2. h = 0 (1,∧ − elimination)
3. h = 0 ∨ ∃xTx (2,∨ − introduction)
4. h 6= 0 (1,∧ − elimination)
5. ∃xTx (3, 4, Disjunctive Syllogism)
Paraconsistent logic does not allow inference through disjunctive syllo-
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gism which means that we do not run the risk of lapsing into trivialism. Is
this idea of using paraconsistent logic plausible?
If supporters of The Indispensability Argument decide to take paracon-
sistent logic seriously the consequences are not trivial. Paraconsistent logic
acts as a foundation for many philosophical areas. Endorsing this kind of
logic would not stop philosophers from applying this outlook to epistemol-
ogy, metaethics, deontic logic, artificial intelligence, semantics, and electron-
ics. The Indispensability Argument originally seemed to be a claim about
entities in science and mathematics however the repercussions are vast. The
inconsistent mathematics we have seen creates tension in the foundations of
this argument. In order to implement indispensability further, we have to be
weary of the weighty philosophical consequences.
4.2.1 Paraconsistent Logic in Science
Colyvan looks to scientific practice and observes it could be plausible for sci-
entists to invoke paraconsistent logic when working with inconsistent theories
[9]. In fact, it seems like there is no other option for scientists who knowingly
involve inconsistent science or mathematics. We have seen a few inconsis-
tencies within science based on mathematical inconsistencies but there are
also inconsistencies that are purely scientific. An example that follows nicely
from the conversation about Newtonian Cosmology as discussed in 3.1 is seen
when scientists try to apply Newtonian gravitational theory to spiral galax-
ies and get a contradiction. In this this study we have titled an object as
indispensable to the theory if there is no competing theory that is as good
without the object being discussed. Inconsistency is not necessarily a reason
for scientists to render the theory useless because there are many other fac-
tors to keep track of. Colyvan and Putnam agree on these factors, including
empirical adequacy, simplicity, utility, and explanatory power of the theory
in question. If consistency held more power than these other attributes, we
would not see working scientists giving thought to inconsistent mathematics
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or science. It is worth pointing out that this is a clear application of Quine's
naturalism because it is zooming in on the practice of scientists.
4.2.2 Paraconsistent Logic in Mathematics: Set Theory
Paraconsistent logic is more complicated when turning to mathematical prac-
tice. Applied paraconsistent logic in mathematics is best seen with the exam-
ple of naive–naive–setset theory. Naive–set theory was a response to Hilbert's
programme within formal logic. David Hilbert challenged mathematicians to
find a consistent and complete set of axioms from which all mathematical
theorems could be derived. Naive–set theory is based on two axioms, ab-
straction and extension. Abstraction says that for a given property there is a
set of all of the objects that satisfy this property, for example, if the property
is “tall” there is a set that is “objects that are tall”. Extension claims that
in order for two sets to be considered the same, it must be the case that their
members are the same. With this theory, we can create any set as long as
they satisfy these claims.
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem given in section 1.2.3 proves that there
is no possible way for such a system to be complete. Russell's Paradox
introduces a precise set that this set theory can not account for.
R = x|x /∈ x
Here we see that there is no answer to Russell's question. In order to be a
member of itself, x must not be a member of itself. Therefore if x is in R then
x is not in R, and if x is not in R then x is in R. Naive–set theory can not
rationalize this set, and therefore is incomplete just as Godel had anticipated.
To formalize a theory to take set R into consideration, Ernst Zermelo and
Abraham Fraenkel had to dispose the first axiom of abstraction and replace
it with eight other much more complicated axioms. These axioms included
the axiom of regularity, schema of specification, pairing, union, schema of
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replacement, infinity, power set, and the well–ordering theorem. In addition
to these new axioms, they created a hierarchy of sets that are used to make
new possible sets. It is safe to say set R cannot be constructed using this
hierarchy.
This impressive reformation of naive–set theory given by Zermelo and
Fraenkel comes with two main costs. First of all, it is unnecessarily confusing.
The extra axioms seem to obviously be addressing a specific problem and not
for any real systemic reason. To prove 1+1 = 2 using this system, Russell and
Whitehead needed 379 pages [22]. This cumbersome system does not make
sense when mathematicians want to apply it to consistent mathematical sets.
Does the issue of a possible inconsistency merit all of these arguably ad hoc
specifications?
It turns out that most mathematicians do not seem to think a possible
inconsistency labels the entire theorem as useless. Naive–set theory, or a sim-
ilar brand, is still used with caution in fields such as analysis, topology, and
algebra [11]. Maarten McKubre–Jordens, a modern mathematician practic-
ing at the University of Canterbury, claims that although mathematicians
might not be quick to admit it, they use naive–set theory in their informal
arguments. Mathematicians rationalize this by claiming that it is reducible
to a set in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory and that is enough reason for them
to proceed. We see mathematicians being tolerable of inconsistent theories
remaining aware that if they are not careful they could run into difficulty.
Perhaps the mathematicians are right and their theories can be put consis-
tently, but the crucial point of interest is that they are not afraid of the
possibility through using this method. Mathematicians use inconsistent the-
ories to pursue the development of other branches that are applied across
many fields [11]. As well as in set theory, mathematicians used the early cal-
culus knowing it stood on inconsistent foundations. Despite the presence of
contradiction, many useful conclusions were made here. It does not seem out
of the question that mathematicians use paraconsistent logic when working
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because they are making use of theorems that are known to be inconsistent.
After this more consistent version of set theory was devised it was ques-
tionable whether it was as powerful as the original theory. Instead of clas-
sifying Russell's paradox as a problem that needs solving, paraconsistent
logicians treat these instances as points of interest worthy of pursuing. This
opens up an entirely new area of study because there are objects that are
only accountable by inconsistent mathematics. McKubre–Jordens puts it
nicely when he says, “Allowing inconsistencies without incoherence opens up
many areas of mathematics previously closed to mathematicians, as well as
being a stepping stone to making sense of some easily described but difficult
to understand phenomena ” [22]. Paraconsistent logic draws a line between
contradiction and absurdity. This creates a system that can be inconsistent
without being completely incoherent unlike in the troll example in 4.2. This
application of paraconsistent logic is illustrated well with the inconsistent
drawings on M.C. Escher and Oscar Reutersvrd. Reutersvard's drawing of
the penrose triangle is unapproachable using consistent geometry. With this
example we see a clearly inconsistent but coherent drawing of a shape that
can only be accounted for through adopting paraconsistent logic.
A more relevant example can be seen in computer science with the halting
problem. We touched on Alan Turing's application of Godel's theorems to
computer programing in section 3.3. The halting problem is a consequence
of this theorem. In computer analysis the halting problem arises when one
cannot determine the fate of an arbitrary running program and an input.
Alan Turing found that a general algorithm to solve this problem for all
possible pairs of input and output cannot exist. This issue of finding whether
or not an algorithm will halt in finite time is similar to many problems
in mathematics and science. Through applying paraconsistent logic, this
problem does not become a dead end worth avoiding at all costs. Instead,
these kind of problems can be re-evaluated for further understanding.
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4.2.3 The Ability To Model Reality Through Mathematical Mod-
els
As we saw with the case of complex numbers, the powerful world of math-
ematics is still a mystery to us. It never occurred to mathematicians that
the controversial complex numbers could be used to adequately to model the
structure of space. The refusal to move forward in studying these inconsis-
tent systems is a scientific error because it does not encourage additional
discovery. The successful application of inconsistent theories is also of inter-
est to the philosopher. We have seen the inconsistent mathematical theories
of calculus and pre–paradox set theory be used to model the real world in
nontrivial ways. If we assume to be living in a consistent world then why is
it the case inconsistent mathematics can so adequately model physical phe-
nomena? Before tackling this problem, there is a question concerning the
nature of mathematics in general that is worth looking at.
The applicability of mathematics, unlike inconsistent mathematics, has
received a considerable amount of attention from philosophers. This problem
relates to the further issue of how an a priori system like mathematics is an
adequate tool for empirical science. There is a general consensus in philoso-
phy that the success of a mathematical theory applied to a physical system
is due to structural similarities between the structures of the two systems [9].
Colyvan points to physical space being modeled successfully by IR3. This is
a special case because the two systems are isomorphic, however, this does
not accurately account for non-isomorphic structures. Colyvan claims that
although extensive work has been done on this topic, no one has successfully
explained how non-isomorphic structures can be explained by one another.
These are huge topics worth further study, however, for my focus I want to
how inconsistent mathematics adds a new facet to these problems.
The question revolves around the assumption that we live in a consistent
world but on occasion it can be structurally assessed by inconsistent theories.
For example, the world explained by calculus for 150 years before Cauchy
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set what Newton and Leibniz started on firm foundations. Colyvan argues
that the early calculus was so successful in physical applications because
it had the important features of the consistent calculus. It seems in this
instance it matters only if the mathematical theorem captures the salient
aspects of the empirical phenomenon at hand [9]. Colyvan then makes the
observation that the proposed model can achieve this independent of the
modelers knowledge [9]. The similarities between the two calculus'explains
why the calculus presented by Leibniz and Newton was so useful. There
are many incorrect theories that have been extremely useful for capturing
the attributes in the contemporary questions. The fact that an inconsistent
theory proves to be so useful could point to a consistent theorem in the
distance. This is another reason to study and not abandon inconsistent
mathematics. A critical study of the inconsistency will lead mathematicians
to a thorough view of why the inconsistency is present. Narrowing down on
a specific inconsistency is the crucial steps in finding the suitable consistent
theory [9].
William Byers also speaks to contradictions in mathematics as a way to
propel discovery. In his book “How Mathematicians Think: Using Ambigu-
ity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics”, he touches on the
creative process of mathematicians. He claims that mathematical progress is
by way of present contradiction. The mathematicians job is to take at first
sight unrelated perspectives on a mathematical structure and unify them
through using known mathematics. Byers makes the argument that a com-
prehensive view of any mathematical system would not be feasible without
the practicing mathematician using inconsistent ideas at some point in their
discovery. Mathematics as a human activity is further testament to how the
underlying mathematical truths are applicable to our physical systems.
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4.3 Conclusion
The uncanny ability of mathematics to model physical systems speaks multi-
tudes to the nature of mathematics. An evaluation of indispensability shows
that a remarkable amount of mathematics has gained footing in the empirical
sciences through explanatory power. When such mathematics is derived it
is often complete with many unobservable corollaries. These abstractions,
although not yet directly applicable to the physical sciences, further root our
discoveries of mathematical truths. There is a trial and error within this
discovery that is much more obvious within the evolution of science. Math-
ematicians are tapping away at the surface of mathematical truths trying
to make our formulated notation consistent with other existing truths. This
sheds light on mathematics as a fundamentally creative activity.
If it is important for working scientists to believe in the existence of
the entities in their theories, then they must adopt paraconsistent logic as a
consequence of the power of The Indispensability Argument. We have looked
at scientific cases where the mathematics in question is inconsistent. In order
to press forward in scientific development it seems reasonable to adapt the
paraconsistent framework with caution. This being said, consistency remains
a possible virtue of mathematical theorems. Nevertheless, consistency is
not the only virtue a theorem can entertain. Mathematicians and scientists
should strive for consistent models to apply to empirical occurrences. It
is not, however, always counterintuitive to endorse inconsistencies along the
way seeing as a better understanding of the particular inconsistency can point
to a solution. The available inconsistent theorems might better capture the
underlying mathematical structures at play. Without taking advantage of
these available theorems, mathematicians and scientists leave the possibility
of missing out on further understanding mathematical truths within their
study.
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